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Abstract: Traditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security 
has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering 
security, and yet, within the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the 
liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the 
security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded 
by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the 
different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that 
toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security 
when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for 
endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue 
that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right 
reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious 
fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we 
argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and 
pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude 
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1. Setting the problem 
Threats of terrorist attacks and of harm from hateful people represent a challenge for contemporary 
democratic societies. The democratic response should grant the security and physical integrity of 
citizens while at the same time minimizing the limitation of liberty rights. Traditionally, an adequate 
strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration. The principle of 
political toleration recommends the political authority to confront conflicts between social parties 
with non-interference in their religious and moral convictions, cultural practices and ways of life, if 
there is no disruption for law and order, and if the rights of all other citizens are respected.1 In other 
                                            
1 We are using here the term citizen – interchangeably with members of the polity – in a generic sense, meaning the set 
of individuals living in the same territory, engaging in social relations between one another and having to abide by the 
decisions of political institutions. For the overall goal of this paper we do not need to specify the formal status of the 
members of the polity that happen to live in the same territory. Hence, our general definition applies to immigrants, 
refugees, non-citizen residents as well as formally recognized citizens.  




words, toleration works as a perfect balance between liberty and security, and yet the maximization 
of individual liberty, allowed by the principle of toleration, has clear boundaries beyond which 
toleration ought to stop. The boundaries are represented by the principle of self-defense of the 
political order and by the harm principle: actions and practices putting the political order at risk, on 
the one hand, or harming third party, on the other, are thus excluded from the area of toleration.2 The 
two principles are uncontentiously subscribed by all scholars of liberty and toleration, even though 
their interpretation is a matter of ongoing controversy. Without getting now into this issue, the area 
outside the boundary of toleration clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the 
rights of all. In this paper, however, we will not discuss the repressive measures necessary when 
toleration fails, but we will instead focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, 
wondering how it works and how it is sustained by which individual attitudes. Indeed, the state, 
granting equal liberty to all, requires toleration of its members in their reciprocal relations, that is, it 
requires that members of the polity withhold their conflicts and disagreements and respect each 
other’s liberty.3 Yet, toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially 
constituting a threat to social security only when it is supplemented by social tolerance.  For, even if 
political toleration is a duty for citizens, it may in fact be coupled with acts of social intolerance. In 
fact, although the disputed practices cannot be banned by any social agent, for only the political 
authority has the coercive power to interfere or refrain to interfere, social agents may nevertheless 
display forms of social intolerance, by means of the social power of stigmatization, exclusion and 
                                            
2 The principle of self-defense of the political order was firstly stated by John Locke (1991 [1685]), while the harm 
principle was presented by John Stuart Mill (1972 [1859]).  
3 Some scholars dispute that political toleration, that is toleration by the liberal democratic state, can ever be the case, 
given that premise to toleration is disapproval of some opinion/behavior by a social party, and given that the liberal state 
should be neutral and not disapproving of anything within the bounds of the law (Horton 1996: 36; Jones 2003: 98; Newey 
1999: 123-127). There are instead other authors who hold a view of toleration dispensing with disapproval, either simply 
endorsing the “live and let live” motto (Balint, 2017), or as a way of accommodating normative diversity (Scheffler 2010). 
Finally, some scholars hold that toleration coexists with neutrality, for there are still questions about which the state is the 
disapproving party granting toleration to some citizens (Farrelly 2003; Jones 2007; Kühler 2019; McKinnon 2013; Newey 
2013). We hold that disapproval is indeed a condition of toleration, and yet, political toleration is not simply a residual 
issue in liberal democracy. Political toleration implies precisely that the dislike among two social parties is dealt with by 





intimidation towards the disapproved party. And social intolerance fuels social insecurity, making the 
political order less stable and open to harmful incursions. Therefore, we must examine the reasons 
that agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disapproval, and granting the balance between 
security and liberty.4 Several kinds of reasons can be listed: some of them are more adequate than 
others to make toleration a just and stable solution to conflicts over religion, ways of life and values. 
We will argue that the right reasons for toleration are those which preserve the moral and epistemic 
integrity of the agent, for in this case she has strong motivation to implement the regime of liberty 
and security for everyone. However, as we shall see, the right reasons for toleration are not accessible 
to everyone, and the open and inclusive democratic society must do with prudential and pragmatic 
reasons as well, which mitigate conflicts and potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. 
The first aim of this paper is then the analysis of the different reasons for toleration which 
move agents to be tolerant, beyond the fact that toleration is the correlative duty to liberty rights. In 
the first part, we will investigate which reasons social agents have to withhold their power of 
interference and assume a tolerant attitude, and, more specifically, whether such reasons, which are 
in fact second-order reasons, are not simply strategic but normative and stable. Then, an analysis of 
the nature of second-order reasons vis-à-vis qualified forms of disagreement (that remain recalcitrant 
to adjudication) will follow and provide an explanation of the epistemic grounds for second-order 
reasons in favor of toleration. At the end of this section, we will be able to point out agent-relative 
reasons for a tolerant attitude not grounded in purely strategic terms.  
If toleration represents the standard solution to conflicts concerning clashes of values, 
religious doctrines and ways of life, it does not appear to be working in cases of people willing to 
recur to violence and terrorist acts. The latter have significantly jeopardized national and international 
                                            
4 In the literature, some authors have clearly stated that the inquiry on toleration is not exhausted by conceptual analysis. 
Instead, a normative theory is required as well, for an inclusive democratic system should also worry about which kind 
of reasons are provided in support of the tolerant act by institutions and/or citizens, since the very same action can be 




security in the last decades and have been a pressing issue of our time. In the second part of the paper, 
we will focus our analysis on cases where the standard solution of toleration seems to be failing. More 
precisely, we will take up the case of religious fundamentalists who at first sight appear to be immune 
to the reasons for toleration.5 Given the general fundamentalists’ outlook, they do not seem to be able 
to accept reasons proceeding from bracketing their religious faith. In order to be acceptable, reasons 
for toleration should seemingly derive from inside their convictions and beliefs, for they are the only 
reasons preserving the agent’s integrity, hence the only reasons that may appear acceptable to a 
religious fundamentalist. In search of reasons acceptable for the religious fundamentalist, we shall 
look into the proposals by two scholars of toleration and conclude that the reasons they offer the 
fundamentalist are effective only in connection with values that are not part of the religious 
fundamentalist outlook. Should we then conclude that the religious fundamentalist is doomed to 
intolerance? In fact, rehearsing the reasons for toleration, we will find that fundamentalists may have 
reasons for tolerating what they disapprove, yet not proceeding from moral and epistemic argument. 
No matter whether fundamentalists’ reasons are purely strategic, and their preference might be for a 
society informed by their doctrine, the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalist, at least until 
they resort to violence. 
Even if toleration for the right reasons represents the ideal solution for dealing with moral, 
religious and doctrinal conflicts without impinging individual liberties and without endangering 
security, democratic society can and should accommodate those who respect others’ liberty just for 
strategic reasons as well. Their allegiance is less stable and their participation is less committed to 
democratic ethos, and yet liberal democracy must be flexible concerning agents’ attitudes toward the 
polity, given that the quest for security ought not to overshadow the crucial role of liberty. In 
conclusion, if violence and terrorism cannot be tolerated, the case of non-violent fundamentalist is 
                                            
5 By religious fundamentalism, in general, we mean a mode of religious conviction of different persuasions that leads its 
holders to be willing to shape the public sphere according to their sets of beliefs regardless to disagreement with others. 
In this paper, we specifically focus on the epistemic attitude generally shared by religious fundamentalists, without 
engaging with an analysis of their faith-related motifs and a nuanced outline of fundamentalism with regard to different 




different and we can in principle reach a peaceful coexistence with them even though the tolerance 
they display is not exactly what would be desirable from the normative perspective. 
 
2. Analysis of the Agent’s Reasons for Toleration 
2.1. The reason for toleration recommends the agent to suspend the reason for disagreement with the 
other agent and to refrain from using the power at her disposal to put a burden on the other agent with 
whom she disagrees. Why toleration of something for which one has reasons to believe it is wrong 
and untrue is a good thing from the point of view of the tolerator is far from obvious, and the solution 
of this puzzle, verging on the paradoxical, has been at the center of all moral analyses of toleration.6 
The conundrum can be solved if the reasons for toleration are thought of as second-order reasons with 
reference to the first-order reasons for disagreement. In turn, second order reasons can either engage 
with the object of controversy directly ‒ and in that case the reasons for toleration are intrinsic to the 
object of conflict ‒ or can exclude the first-order reason on grounds of different kinds of consideration 
‒ and in that case the reasons for toleration are exclusionary and extrinsic to the disagreement.7  
Reasons for toleration can thus be classified as follows: 
a. Prudential reasons. Prudential reasons are extrinsic reasons derived by the intention to comply 
with the civic duty to reciprocally tolerate each other for self-interested reasons. 
b. Pragmatic reasons. Beyond the civic duty to tolerate each other, agents may have pragmatic 
reasons to be socially tolerant, such as a preference for social peace or the value of pluralism. These 
are typical cases of exclusionary, extrinsic reasons, recommending to put aside the disagreement, and 
to act on different kinds of considerations. 
                                            
6 Brenda Cohen (1967) defines the issue of the justification of toleration as the paradox of toleration, for the agent finds 
herself trapped between her moral reasons, suggesting intervening, and the reasons for toleration recommending self-
restraint. It is however disputed whether toleration really implies a paradox (Newey 1999). On the justification of 
toleration see Mendus (1988). 




c. Moral reasons. Agents can furthermore choose social toleration because of the value of autonomy 
or the value of equal respect deemed of a higher order than the reasons for disagreement, or by a 
moral disposition to be open towards other people and their difference (Forst 2013; Newey 1999). In 
this case, the reasons for toleration are not exclusionary, but rather overriding the reasons for the 
disapproval of the other side. Yet moral reasons do not directly engage the conflict over truth-matters 
involved in the controversy.  
d. Epistemic reasons. This last kind of reasons, which we are going to analyze in the following 
section, instead engage directly with the object of the controversy hence provide epistemically 
reasons for toleration.  
Most theories of toleration have discussed the issue of the moral justification of toleration, 
thus directly or indirectly facing the problem of the moral integrity of the tolerator. In this respect, 
either toleration is thought to follow from moral reasons of a higher order, thus overriding the reasons 
for disapproval (Mendus 1988, 1989; Forst 2013), or is conceived of as an aretaic virtue of the 
character meaning the attitude to be well disposed and open-minded towards other people different 
from oneself (Newey 1999). In either case, the moral integrity of the tolerator is granted. Few scholars 
instead have taken up the issue of the tolerator’s epistemic integrity,8 and yet it is theoretically as 
serious as the problem of moral integrity. If an agent, facing disagreement with another agent, is 
convinced of the truth of her first-order reasons, and believes that the other agent’s beliefs are false, 
how can she tolerate them without conflicting with her own epistemic states? Actually, she may have 
purely strategic reasons for toleration. In that case, she keeps her disapproval of the other party 
untouched, tolerating the other party’s conviction as a second best, as a purely prudential move under 
the circumstances, but also potentially ready to switch from toleration to intolerance under favorable 
                                            
8 Rainer Forst is an exception to this trend. In chapter 11 “The finitude of reason” of Toleration in Conflict (2013), he 
faces what he labels as the relativization of the truth paradox. His proposed solution is based on the distinction between 
ethical judgements and moral judgments. The former are reasonable, but rejectable, while moral principles are such that 
no reasonable person can reject them. The reasons for disapproval belong to ethical judgments while the reasons for 
toleration are properly non-rejectable reasons. Hence, in Forst view there is no epistemic contradiction between holding 
ethical reasons, believing them true, and nevertheless being tolerant of contrasting reasons, given the rejectable nature of 




circumstances. In this case, her epistemic integrity is not questioned by the agent’s forbearance, but 
toleration turns out unstable. Alternatively, can she adopt toleration for less unstable reasons, for 
example for moral intrinsic reasons, without ending up epistemically divided between her convictions 
and the acceptance of erroneous beliefs? One possibility may be for the agent to become skeptic 
concerning moral convictions, so that she may endorse toleration of the opposite opinion without 
being epistemically divided. Yet, if she became skeptic, then her views would be as worth as the 
views of her opponent, hence toleration would be superfluous for the conflict would be dissolved. 
The issue that we are going to pursue then concerns whether an agent, facing entrenched disagreement 
and convinced of the truth of her views, can be tolerant for non-extrinsic reasons without being torn 
between her first-order reasons for disapproval and her second-order reasons for tolerating the opinion 
contrary to the one she holds. 
 
2.2. The distinction between reasons of different order is fundamental for our analysis, since our goal 
is to focus on the strictly epistemic reasons that agents facing disagreement often employ in the 
attempt either to solve the impasse or to manage the conflicts arising from the unresolved 
disagreement. Specifically, first-order epistemic reasons are reasons directly supporting a specific 
belief the agent holds to be correct. In this section our analysis focuses on second-order epistemic 
reasons, therefore looking at the epistemic distinction between believing that p and having second-
order reasons concerning the degree of justifiability (or certainty) of the belief that p. In order to grasp 
the distinction between epistemic reasons of different orders, let us introduce what is called the 
doxastic presupposition of justification. According to the doxastic presupposition, the epistemic role 
of justification is not exhausted by the introduction of a set of reasons ‘R’ that provides a propositional 
justification for the belief that p. Rather, any comprehensive justification should involve a doxastic 
analysis that assesses whether agent S actually has grounded her belief that p on the reasons that 
propositionally justify it. In order to evaluate the justifiability of S’ belief about p fully, we have to 




deliberative performance actually provided by S in assuming p as a valid belief within her doxastic 
system of beliefs.  
The analysis of the doxastic processes employed by agents is a good starting point to assess 
epistemic second-order reasons.9 Since doxastic aspects are always involved in our epistemic 
processes, it appears that two different agents, Sarah and Mark, might share first-order reasons in 
support of the belief that p, but doing so with different levels of confidence, given their own sets of 
second-order epistemic reasons on the matter.10 Also, more importantly, an analysis of the epistemic 
relevance of second-order reasons coupled with an exposition of the doxastic presupposition allows 
one to conclude that Sarah might be doxastically justified in holding the belief that p, even when the 
belief that p is not epistemically warranted from a non-doxastic perspective.  
When debating over complex evidence, agents tend to disagree. They disagree both on the 
matter at stake (believing that p or believing ~p) and on the reliability of their justificatory processes, 
therefore debating the epistemic second-order reasons they present in support of their different 
beliefs. Since it is really unlikely – if not impossible – that any agent can claim a full appraisal of the 
evidence at stake, very often agents end up disagreeing not just about diverging beliefs per se, but 
also about the tenability of the reasons in support of these beliefs. From the epistemic perspective, 
the only solution for solving the disagreement is to provide conclusive reasons in favour either of the 
belief that p or of the belief that ~p. There are, however, at least two orders of concern regarding this 
strategy. First, many epistemic arguments can be advanced showing that evidence is ‘too complex’ 
to be attained by agents fully – with certainty. Consider, for example, the diachronic and social aspects 
of our belief formation processes (Sosa 2010) and the fact that disagreement is brought about by 
agents employing different systems of epistemic norms while reasoning about the same piece of 
                                            
9 For further analyses see Brink (1989); Feldman (2002); Turri (2010). 
10 The doxastic presupposition clearly makes sense within an internalist account of epistemic justification. We do not 
have room to provide a comparison between internalist accounts and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. 
Rather, apart from epistemic reasons in support of  the internalist view, we want to stress that the issue of epistemic 
integrity related to the act of tolerating a belief (or an act based on a belief) we deem wrong or dislikeable is more pressing  




evidence. Second, two aspects of value disagreement must be stressed: i. there is no final criterion to 
establish which agent is actually more justified than others – in her or his doxastic set of beliefs – in 
supporting the right system of epistemic norms (Goldman 2010); ii. the strategy of referring to 
experts, usually regarded as reliable in factual matters, is not available in the evaluative domain, for 
it is doubtful that agents would agree on the epistemic authority to cast a judgment regarding p and 
~p.11 
Such concerns can be addressed referring to the fallibilist account of knowledge. As well-
known, fallibilism is an epistemic stance according to which the kind of knowledge attained by agents 
is indeed compatible with the possibility of error. In other words, given that agents’ epistemic 
processes for disclosing evidence can never grant certainty, errors cannot be in principle ruled out 
from genuine claims to knowledge. This conclusion follows from the fact that the reasons an agent 
holds in her doxastic system of beliefs may possibly be very good, but never warranted as 
conclusively true. In order to clarify this point, a distinction should be traced between two 
understandings of ‘knowing’: 
1. If S knows p, then S is not mistaken about p. 
2. If S knows p, then p cannot be false. 
Fallibilism accepts (1) and rejects (2). Definition (2) implies a too high epistemic standard, that is, a 
Thesis of Infallibility sustained by the Impossibility of Error Argument, according to which “to know 
something requires that it be that sort of thing that you could not be mistaken about” (Feldman 2002: 
125). A fallibilist account of knowledge maintains that it is possible for agent S to be justified in 
believing that p, even if S’ full body of evidence for p does not necessarily entails the truth of p.  
This epistemic analysis is relevant for understanding which sort of second-order epistemic 
reasons can motivate agents to act tolerantly. First, the doxastic presupposition for the assessment of 
                                            
11 The core problem lying at the heart of the debate concerns whether two people can, on the basis of the same evidence, 
reasonably come to different conclusions. It is important to note that such debate relate with the discussion concerning 
the nature of evidence, specifically with the opposition between the Uniqueness thesis and the Permissiveness thesis. 
According to the former, a body of evidence justifies one single doxastic state, whereas the latter says that the overall 




agent’s justificatory processes perfectly expresses the intuition that agents’ perspective cannot be 
bracketed when dealing with the political practice of making collective decisions, because the 
reference to a non-doxastic standpoint is not available – or at least not publicly justifiable. Second, 
underlining the epistemic limits – shared by all agents – to the full disclosure of evidence, both at the 
personal and at the social level, provides us with an argument in favour of fallibilism as an adequate 
meta-epistemic standpoint that agents can reasonably share, notwithstanding their disagreements over 
beliefs, values and ways of life. Third, since we have shown that epistemic integrity is important for 
tolerant agents, a deeper analysis is in order related to which kind of epistemic attitudes are the 
adequate response to the fact of qualified disagreement.  
 
2.3. In the growing literature concerning the epistemology of disagreement, many authors have 
reasoned about which is the adequate epistemic response when agents face qualified reasonable 
disagreement. Agents face qualified reasonable disagreement when: 
a) they hold mutually incompatible positions,  
b) each has a reason to hold the belief they do, 
c) it is extremely hard (if not impossible) for a rational person judging the disagreement to 
establish with a public procedure who has the epistemic authority to make claims that count 
as conclusive reasons for solving the disagreement. 
In case of genuine disagreement over public matters, agents tend to hold mutually incompatible 
positions and, granted the relevance of the doxastic presupposition, they do so with at least what they 
deem to be reasonable doxastic reasons in support of their beliefs. Moreover, as said, public 
disagreements over evaluative matters cannot usually be solved thanks to the appeal to external 
authorities that are publicly acknowledged by all the agents involved in the conflict.12 It appears then 
                                            
12 The normative constraint of public justifiability plays a fundamental role in our argument against the possibility of 
referring to a non-doxastic standpoint in order to solve evaluative disagreements adequately. In deeply disharmonious 




that, prima facie, beliefs that are mutually incompatible can still be sustained with a good degree of 
credibility and tenability starting from the agent-relative doxastic systems of beliefs. These forms of 
entrenched disagreement are hard to deal with, since neither party can give up their position without 
making cognitive changes that are felt to be impossible, or alienating, or even a threat to their sense 
of who they are. How can then we move from this stalemate to any intrinsic reason to act tolerantly 
toward other agents holding diverging beliefs, values and ideals? 
 Epistemologists mostly have distinguished two possible reactions to the fact of qualified 
reasonable disagreement. According to the Conciliatory View (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Feldman 
2006, 2007; Lackey 2010), the fact that an epistemic peer13 disagrees with me with regard to the 
evaluation of the same piece of evidence is a good second-order reason to ‘bite the bullet’ and at least 
question the epistemic processes that led me to believe that p. A strong interpretation of the 
conciliatory view calls for a revision of my belief in the attempt to split the difference and give equal 
weight in the evaluation of both mine and others’ opinions (Gelfert 2011). A less demanding 
interpretation requires that I reconsider the level of epistemic trust I have in the belief that p, with no 
need to revise the belief itself. By contrast, the Steadfast View claims that, given the absence of an 
external epistemic authority acknowledged by all, a better doxastic response is to ‘stick to my own 
guns’ and not revise or reconsider the trust in my belief. Such a view claims that I can keep believing 
the truthfulness of my belief, regardless of the qualified disagreement with a peer. Authors provide 
different reasons in support of this strategy, such as the fact that higher-order evidence concerning 
the other party epistemic standpoint does not count (Kelly 2005), or they refer to the ineliminable 
                                            
doxastic perspectives of the agents involved – will hardly result to be publicly justifiable for all. Therefore, such strategy 
is not available as a solution to solve evaluative disagreements peacefully, because any reference to epistemic authorities 
would itself be contested.  
13 We are aware that epistemologists have concentrated on ideal circumstances in which epistemic peers, namely agents 
that possess similar epistemic abilities and are also more or less equal with respect to their familiarity with the body of 
evidence and the informational set, reasonably end up sustaining different conclusions. Obviously, the circumstances of 
politics are not at all ideal and hardly citizens can be considered epistemic peers. However, we believe that this debate 




aspects of the first-person standpoint and argue that we have good epistemic reasons to self-trust our 
own perspective, since it is indeed ours (Enoch 2011; Foley 2011; Wedgwood 2010).  
 A couple of caveats are now in order for showing the relevance of the epistemology of 
disagreement debate to the epistemic reasons for toleration. First, it is a feature of public debates over 
evaluative matters that the evidence at stake is uncertain and ambiguous, therefore making it difficult, 
if not impossible, to reach a full disclosure of evidence. Indeed, this is perfectly compatible with the 
fallibilist account we introduced previously. Second, according to our interpretation of toleration, at 
stake in public settings is whether agents can keep their epistemic integrity while assuming a tolerant 
attitude toward beliefs, acts and attitudes they dislike and/or believe grounded in false beliefs. In this 
respect, the conciliatory view appears more apt to provide epistemic reasons in favor of a tolerant 
attitude. Stressing the social aspects of the belief formation processes, the conciliatory view rejects 
epistemic dogmatism as the inadequate response to disagreement from the epistemic perspectives. 
We can go further and connect the “conciliatory attitude” with the claim that epistemic modesty is 
the appropriate standpoint in contexts where the appraisal of evidence is always contested (Bistagnino 
and Zuolo 2018; Peter 2013). Being epistemically modest does not mean that agents are not ready to 
fight for their own opinions or beliefs, rather it means that they can do so while still accepting the 
unquestionable fallibility of our epistemic processes qua human beings. 
We hold that, when facing qualified persisting disagreement, agents have sound second-order 
reasons in support of diminish – even minimally – the degree of confidence in their first-order beliefs. 
This epistemic attitude of modesty is grounded in a counterfactual argument: an epistemically 
reasonable Sarah is ready to accept the possibility that in case the evidence at stake was directly and 
fully accessible and her epistemic capacities infallible her present belief that p might indeed turn out 
to be false and Mark’s belief that ⁓p true. According to our epistemic account, Sarah can take the 
counterfactual argument as a second-order reason in favor of a modest epistemic attitude toward her 
doxastic system of beliefs, without endangering her epistemic and agential integrity in believing that 





2.4. At first sight, an objection to our argument is that members of the polity are not actual epistemic 
peers and, even more importantly, that social agents tend to dismiss other parties’ agential and 
epistemic virtues. However, a crucial tenet of democratic legitimacy is that each member of the polity 
should be treated with equal respect, and that, in order to respect their agency properly, their opinions 
should be granted fair hearing. Even if in a democratic context, citizens are not required to see and 
treat each other as epistemic peers, yet the deliberative setting in which agents exchange opinions in 
the democratic arena imposes the moral duty of treating each other on an equal footing. If we couple 
this normative precondition of democratic systems with the meta-epistemic standpoint of modesty 
regarding the tenability of our evaluative beliefs, we can draw the conclusion that reasonable agents 
have epistemic reasons for partly diminishing their confidence in their own beliefs and for not 
dismissing the other parties’ beliefs as completely unjustified. The kind of mutual acknowledgment 
that is envisioned in such exchanges is firstly morally grounded in the principle of equal respect and 
then sustained by epistemic reasons as well, derived from the recognition of our shared fallibility as 
epistemic agents (Author 2020; Leland and van Wietmarschen 2012; Peter 2013).  
   We argue that the attitude of epistemic modesty can be included in the ideal of reasonableness, 
a crucial feature of liberal citizenship, thus providing an intrinsic epistemic reason in favor of a 
tolerant attitude toward other citizens we strongly disagree with.  Briefly, the practical virtue of 
reasonableness is a fundamental concept in the literature concerning political liberalism and 
democratic legitimacy (Boettcher 2004; Habermas 1995; Quong 2011; Rawls 1993). Reasonableness 
is a crucial civic virtue allowing agents to cooperate notwithstanding the persistent disagreement that 
characterizes democratic societies. Reasonable members of the polity share the following features: i. 
they are aware of the normative constraint of reciprocity; ii. they are ready to restrain themselves 
from employing strictly private reasons while debating political matters; iii. they are conscious of the 




   Consistently with the general epistemic framework we defend in this work, we hold that a 
reasonable agent is aware of the limitations of humans’ doxastic processes for establishing knowledge 
and is, consequently, ready to recognize the right of other parties to disagree with her on evaluative 
matters.14 In sum, reasonable agents have intrinsic epistemic reasons to be tolerant of ideas, opinions 
and values they do not share and, more importantly, genuinely dislike. The epistemic dimension of 
reasonableness, if interpreted in this way, does not impose a demanding standard of epistemic 
rationality on agents engaged in public deliberative processes. Rather, this reading involves a 
normative request for reasonable citizens to undertake an attitude of epistemic modesty while 
deliberating public matters with agents with whom they disagree. These considerations are crucial for 
a liberal conception of democracy, because they provide agents with epistemic reasons in favor of 
toleration. Epistemic reasons for toleration, while preserving the epistemic integrity of agents, 
contribute to political stability and to civic friendship. Reasonable citizens, in respecting other citizens 
as free and equal members of the same cooperative scheme, must be able to respect the intellectual 
and evaluative autonomy granted to any member of the constituency qua citizen. 
   To conclude, there are second-order reasons in favor of toleration as a positive social attitude 
and of intellectual modesty as an epistemic attitude that are grounded in the epistemic analysis of our 
fallible epistemic abilities. A reasonable member of the polity has second-order reasons, both moral 
and epistemic, that justify a tolerant attitude, notwithstanding the genuine disagreement she faces 
with other agents.15 What about individuals who are not reasonable though? How do they confront 
entrenched disagreement with others? With reference to disagreement, members of the polity are 
                                            
14 It is worth highlighting that our argument in favor of the attitude of epistemic modesty around which we build our 
notion of toleration for intrinsic epistemic reasons relies on the recognition of fallibilism as the most adequate account of 
human knowledge. Fallibilism does not coincide with skepticism or relativism. Fallibilism is a rather lesser demanding 
epistemic standpoint that does not require us to take a stance regarding the ontological status of moral facts or about the 
impossibility of justifying any belief at all. We also maintain that the epistemic analysis we propose is compatible with a 
technical reading of the burdens of judgment introduced by John Rawls (1993) in order to provide epistemic support for 
the virtue of reasonableness (Author, 2015). 
15 A similar view is defended by Robert Audi (2011) that maintains that an overriding obligation to tolerate partly depends 
upon an epistemic argument in support of a general attitude of humility and respect for others’ view derived by an 




unreasonable if a. they tend to show an unshakeable self-trust in their first-person standpoint and b. 
their set of second-order reasons supporting the belief that p are usually not affected by the contrasts 
and the diverging views of other citizens.  
   Among unreasonable members of the polity, religious fundamentalists present a special 
challenge to the toleration of convictions and viewpoints different from their own and to a respectful 
coexistence in pluralist democracies. Generally speaking, fundamentalists are characterized by a 
dogmatic attitude that leads them to resist systematically to the second-order reasons that support 
adopting a tolerant attitude toward people holding views that they disapprove.16 Convinced of the 
alleged objectivity and truthfulness of their doxastic standpoint, they altogether reject the fallibilist 
counterfactual clause. As a result, they find no reason to tolerate what they see as false, wrong, and 
perverting the moral fabric of society. Consequently, they may be perceived as representing a threat 
to political order and security, so as to provoke intolerant institutional responses to their perceived 
intolerant attitude.17  Yet, are such responses justified in the context of democratic principles and are 
they adequate to keep the balance between liberty and security?  In the next section, we consider two 
proposals that try to solve the impasse, and assess whether they can provide religious fundamentalists 
with second-order reasons in favor of toleration compatible with their system of beliefs. 
 
3. Is Toleration Precluded to the Religious Fundamentalist? 
3.1. The case of the religious fundamentalist is worth a thorough analysis, for epistemic and moral 
reasons for intolerance are here intertwined. The fundamentalist opposes what she sees as false, for 
different religious or non-religious views are contrary to the true word of God, and wrong too, for 
                                            
16 We like to stress that in our view what characterizes fundamentalism is not a given doctrine, but rather the dogmatic 
attitude displayed in support of any given doctrine. 
17 Here, the distinction between people holding a fundamentalist view and people ready to act out of a fundamentalist 
doctrine is paramount. Democratic state cannot tolerate violence and terrorist acts, which go beyond the boundary of 
toleration. A different problem is however represented by people holding and expressing a fundamentalist view, which is 
what we are focusing on. In this case, liberal democracy, for the sake of its principles, should not stop short of toleration, 




false beliefs imply a conduct and a lifestyle outside the precepts of the true religion. Moreover, the 
fundamentalist thinks that it is wrong to let the error be and propagate, for false doctrines pollute 
society and may condemn even more souls to damnation that would otherwise be saved. In the eye 
of the religious fundamentalist, at stake there is eternal salvation that is the highest value and good 
for human beings. In this background, it is clear that the pragmatic reasons for toleration fail, for they 
imply bracketing the first-order reason for disapproval and the consideration of a different order of 
reasons  such as the preference for peace or for the value of pluralism. Similarly, the moral reasons 
for toleration cannot in this case override the reasons for objection to false doctrines. For the 
fundamentalist does not acknowledge any moral or pragmatic reason of a higher order than salvation 
and implementing God’s word and will. Susan Mendus (2008) has remarked that either toleration is 
unavailable for the fundamentalist or she must find reasons she can accept from within her perspective 
and such that do not question or weaken her faith. In other words, either the fundamentalist finds 
internal reasons to tolerate the error, or toleration is impossible for her. Even though finding internal 
reasons for toleration looks very unlikely, Susan Mendus thinks that there are in fact epistemic 
arguments fit to persuade the religious fundamentalist in favor of toleration. Not surprisingly, 
Mendus’s arguments are sophisticated reinterpretations of modern political doctrines, especially of 
Locke’s Letter on Toleration, given that the seventeenth and eighteenth century doctrines precisely 
confronted the problem of religious conflict, of persecution and of violence for religious motives, and 
tried to persuade the true believer that toleration of dissenting views was not a compromise, but a 
principled solution. The most well-known argument for toleration advanced by Locke is the argument 
from the irrationality of persecution, according to which beliefs cannot be forced by coercion. This 
argument however has been deeply criticized by Jeremy Waldron (1991), among others, for empirical 
evidence shows that actually beliefs can be changed via coercion. Yet, as stressed by Mendus, holding 
true beliefs is not sufficient for religious salvation; it is also necessary to have acquired and to hold 
them in the right way (Mendus 2008: 26). Under this light, forcing the true beliefs on dissenters 




according to Mendus, is the argument from irrelevance or “impertinence” of persecution (Mendus 
2008: 30). The argument from impertinence sanctions the separation between Church and State, 
respectively in matters of the soul’s salvation, and in matters of peace and order. In turn, such 
separation is grounded on the argument that God, being infinitely good, for a crucial question as 
salvation, has endowed each person with the capacity to examine and decide for herself, and, by 
contrast, has not bestowed the magistrate with the authority to decide on the salvation of his subjects. 
Thus, God has granted equal epistemic authority to all human beings, so that each ought to look for 
the truth and salvation using his or her judgement, and no one else, be it a fellow believer or the state, 
has business in imposing his or her path to salvation on any other.  
Mendus holds that Locke’s arguments drawing their force from within religion can speak to 
the contemporary fundamentalist as well for they do not threaten or weaken her convictions. Indeed 
Locke’s arguments have the advantage to engage with the religious beliefs, and to provide reasons 
for toleration internal to the religious convictions, instead of asking the believer to bracket or put 
aside such convictions in name of other ideals she cannot acknowledge as superior. Yet, in order to 
work, these arguments are conditional on two assumptions: a) the fundamentalist thinks his duty to 
save souls and not to eradicate the error; b) he accepts the equal epistemic authority of anyone 
concerning the search for true salvation.18 In other words, Mendus’s revisitation of Locke is appealing 
only to some religious believer who prioritizes souls’ salvation of the erring people over suppressing 
the false doctrines, which was the main justification of persecution during the religious wars 
following Reformation. In case the religious believer’s crucial goal is rather to destroy the infidels 
and eradicate the wrong religion and worldview, Mendus’s argument is ineffective. Moreover, in 
many religious persuasions, Christian or otherwise,  epistemic authority over religious matters, 
                                            
18 Humeira Iqtidar (2020), discussing the work of Muslim scholar Ghamidi, and its specifically non-liberal path to 
toleration, shows that the tolerant attitude is grounded on the virtue of Khushu, that is humility in considering other people 
in a non-judgmental way. Actually, humility corresponds to the attitude of epistemic modesty, and makes all humans 
equal. Despite the significant difference between Ghamidi and Locke’s argument, both refer to the epistemic equality of 
human beings, and moreover Ghamidi endorses epistemic modesty as justification for a general attitude of restraint on 




included salvation, is far from being equally distributed, and it is usually monopolized by the Church 
and its clergy, or by prophets, rabbis or other authorized intermediaries.19 Hence, in order to bite, the 
argument from impertinence requires that epistemic equality is previously accepted by the religious 
fundamentalist as a God’s gift. Yet it is hard to reconcile the acknowledgement of epistemic equality 
with her highest degree of trust in her (first-order) beliefs. In other words, the religious fundamentalist 
can be persuaded by Locke’s arguments if he or she is already reasonable and accepts that each person 
has a right (bestowed by God) to search for salvation according to her light. Yet if she is reasonable 
in this sense, she is a devout religious believer but hardly a fundamentalist according to our previous 
definition.   
 
3.2. Let us now consider another argument aimed at persuading the fundamentalist to toleration, 
advanced by John Tate (2016). He too is providing reasons that do not challenge the religious beliefs 
of the fundamentalist, deriving in fact from those very beliefs. Like Mendus, Tate rephrases an 
argument that Locke developed in his expansion of the Letter on Toleration, while discussing with 
Jonas Proast and trying to convince the Anglican theologian of the good of toleration. According to 
Tate, the Lockean argument that true religious believers can accept is epistemic and refers to the 
distinction between knowing the truth, and possessing the truth via faith. Only true knowledge can be 
transmitted for it is irresistible, not true faith, for faith is not grounded on evidence that all rational 
cognizers must acknowledge. Locke’s skeptical argument concerning the ‘knowledge’ of the true 
religion leaves intact the faith in the true religion and the related conviction of its truth. The distinction 
between knowing something and having faith in something justifies the exclusion of coercion for 
errors that cannot be known for sure, prescribing instead toleration. In Tate’s view, such reasoning is 
in principle acceptable by the true believer for it does not question that her faith is true, only that it 
                                            
19 In almost all religions, however, there are interpretative traditions challenging the epistemic authority of the Church or 
the clergy and proposing something closer to the epistemic equality coupled with epistemic modesty, so as to open the 




can universally be known to be true. It follows that faith cannot be imposed given that it cannot 
provide non-rejectable evidence and grounds for any rational cognizer.  
Even though Tate’s argument, like the previous one, takes the perspective of the true believer 
seriously, and tries to provide him or her with internal reasons, this epistemic argument cannot 
convince the religious fundamentalist to embrace toleration instead of intolerance. In order to accept 
the distinction between knowledge and faith as different paths to truths, the fundamentalist must first 
be convinced that the truth arrived at by faith may ever diverge from the truth reached by knowledge. 
But, even if she might acknowledge that the access to truth follows different paths, truth is in any 
case, and for everyone, true, and, while the faithful lacks the lever for convincing the unfaithful of 
the word of God, the latter, being nonetheless true, gives the believer no reasons to refrain to act on 
its basis. In order to have reason to withhold her intervention with wrong beliefs or false religion, she 
must admit either that, lacking final evidence, her faith may be false – as shown in the fallibilist 
counterfactual clause –, or that only known truths are rightfully imposed for, in that case, reason 
cannot reject knowledge. Neither arguments are however consistent with the dogmatic position of the 
religious fundamentalist. 
 
3.3. In sum, both Mendus and Tate’s appeals to toleration are not providing the religious 
fundamentalist with sufficient internal reasons for toleration. As we have seen, both arguments work 
only in conjunction with other beliefs and values, such as the priority of the salvation of infidels’ 
souls over the eradication of errors and purification of the world, or the preference for peaceful 
coexistence of differing values, or the epistemic distinction between knowledge and faith. These 
supplementary beliefs and values are hardly part of the internal reasons of the religious 
fundamentalist, and yet they are necessary to transform the above arguments in actual reasons for 
toleration. Shall we then conclude that the religious fundamentalist can be anything but intolerant? 
We have said that neither pragmatic nor moral reasons work for the fundamentalist for there are no 




intolerance; two main options seem available. Firstly, the fundamentalist may acquiesce with 
religious errors out of necessity. Acquiescence is an intolerant attitude coupled with non-obstructive 
behavior for the lack of power of interference or suppression. (King 1976). It is far from ideal, 
especially since it is not stable: the acquiescent person may easily turn intolerant under change of 
circumstances. Alternatively, she may be tolerant for strategic reasons: in this case, the second-order 
reasons do not engage with the object of the controversy, but merely appeals to prudential motivation 
to forebear the religious error. The two possibilities are actually very similar in practice, but while in 
the first case, the agent feels forced to non-interference, in the second case, the agent has chosen 
forbearance even if just for prudential reasons. Both are unstable, with a slightly different degree of 
instability. The fundamentalist who has chosen toleration for prudential reasons has apparently 
excluded to resort to intolerant acts, while the acquiescent fundamentalist may be more prone to resort 
to intolerance given the opportunity. However, even though epistemic and moral arguments are not 
accessible to the religious fundamentalist, the fundamentalist is not excluded by liberal society, for 
not only she can coexist and practice her faith in peace, but also, in the due course of time, she may 
come to value the freedom afforded in a tolerant environment. 
 
Conclusions 
Contemporary democracy is characterized by a high degree of pluralism and diversity, potentially 
nurturing conflicts and undermining security. In this work, we have contended that toleration 
represents the ideal balance between the right to security and the right to freedom, insofar as it allows 
for peaceful coexistence of diversity without requiring extra limitations of liberty. Yet, toleration 
works within limits beyond which the liberty of some may threaten the security and the rights of 
others and the very persistence of democratic order. The boundaries of a tolerant society are hardly 
clear-cut, and many fuzzy cases are located at its fringe. For this reason, we have tried to map the 
tolerant society from the center to the fringe through the analysis of the various reasons agents have 




members of the polity for a large range of reasons from strategic to moral, to epistemic. We have 
shown that moral and epistemic reasons stabilize toleration and sustain maximal liberty without 
endangering anyone’s rights and social security. At the same time, moral and epistemic reasons for 
toleration preserve the agent integrity who has found them within her own moral and epistemic 
convictions.  
This ideal solution is however not always available in a highly pluralistic society such as 
contemporary democracy and we hold that democratic society should in principle be hospitable 
towards all sorts of reasons, even the ones sustaining an unstable support to democratic principles, at 
least until there is no recur to violence. On the one side, filtering out strategic and pragmatic reasons 
for toleration would turn out too demanding on members of the polity. On the other, the exclusion of 
religious fundamentalists, if they have not committed harmful acts towards third party, is unjustified 
for it breaches the liberal promise of openness and inclusion of everyone without moral distinctions 
among people. Moreover, it is counterproductive as well, for it can push the fundamentalist beyond 
the boundary of lawful conduct. Finally, it would imply an unduly restriction of the area of toleration 
to those who are already reasonable, paradoxically transforming democratic societies in quite illiberal 
ones. In other words, restricting toleration to those members of the polity that endorse it for the right 
reasons, may not deliver security within liberty, forcing the tip too much in favor of the right to 
security at the expense of liberty rights.  
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